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THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTIES
IN MARYLAND
The Maryland Legislature in 1969 provided for increased
consumer protection for third party beneficiaries of warranties.
This comment explores the effectiveness of that legislation and
concludes that it is sufficient if the courts apply it liberally. If
the courts cannot use the present law effectively, suggested
legislative alternatives are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code' was adopted in Maryland in 1964.2
In so doing, the state of Maryland adopted alternative "A" of
§ 2-318,' which by its language allows for recovery by certain third
party beneficiaries for breach of warranty. In 1969 the Maryland
legislature expanded the protection found in § § 2-314 through 2-318'
when it abolished "the requirement of privity in actions brought under
these sections."' This action was taken because testimony before the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Delegates indicated that
"Maryland is far behind other states in extending implied and expressed
warranties to third party beneficiaries." 6 This comment will consider
the judicial and legislative success of the State of Maryland in
1. Hereinafter referred to as UCC.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B (1964).
3. Law of Feb. 1, 1964, ch. 538, § 1 [1963] Laws of Md. 786, as amended MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 95B § 2-318 (Supp. 1972). Maryland adopted Alternative A as cited in 6 UCC REP.-
DIG. § 2-318, at 1-100.1:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
clude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is in-
jured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the war-
ranty extends.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, §§ 2-314 to -318 Supp. 1972).
5. Ch. 249 [1969] Laws of Md. 709. Item 256, Explanation, in the Office of Legislative Refer-
ence, Annapolis, Md.
6. Id.
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protecting persons, not in privity with the seller, who are injured by
defective products.
7
II. DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF MARYLAND LAW
The 1969 legislation added the phrase "or any other ultimate
consumer or user of the goods or person affected thereby" 8 to the first
sentence of the section. In so doing, the legislature clearly increased the
horizontal privity of sales in Maryland, providing protection to a user,
consumer, or some person affected by the goods other than a purchaser
or subpurchaser. 9 Vertical privity, on the other hand, involves the
rights of a subpurchaser, or one who has dealt with a seller-retailer
rather than the manufacturer. 0
7. It should be noted at the outset that "warranties" evolved from the laws of contract and
sales, and traditionally required privity. Courts have expanded warranty protection by
engrafting tort principles onto it. Strict liability, on the other hand, has come about by
relaxation of the negligence for which a manufacturer is accountable. This comment deals
with "warranties" because that technique was applied to expand protection to third
party beneficiaries by the Maryland legislature. Of the different remedies Prosser has
said:
All this is pernicious and unnecessary. No one doubts that, unless there is
privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in contract. There is no
need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it is 'only by some vio-
lent pounding and twisting' that 'warranty' can be made to serve the purpose at all.
Why talk of it? If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in
tort, declared outright, without any illusory contract mask. Such strict liability is
familiar enough in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance,
workmen's compensation, and respondeat superior. There is nothing so shocking
about it today that it cannot be accepted and stand on its own feet in this new
and additional field, provided always that public sentiment, public demand, and
'public policy' have reached the point where the change is called for.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
Kessler, on the other hand, says that as between a warranty theory and a tort theory
the former is more desirable. He takes this position because warranty protection under
the UCC still requires notice and allows disclaimers but the Restatement of Tortsdoes
not allow either. Kessler notes that the notice required for a lay consumer and a merchant
is different; the difference being based on a desire to detect bad faith on the part of the
seller. This is not an attempt to deprive the good faith consumer of his remedy. The pro-
visions in §2-318 are the most lenient here as the injured have complied with good faith
as long as they notify the manufacturer "once they are aware of their legal consideration."
Thus, any further relaxation of notice is foolish in Kessler's opinion. The disclaimers per-.
missible under the UCC are uncertain according to Kessler, depending on the weight
given to the various sections of § 2-316 and § 2-719(3). Kessler believes that the flexibility
available in interpreting valid disclaimers and unconscionable disclaimers is an asset to
the UCC and can be exercised by the courts without resorting to the device of strict lia-
bility. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 904-909 (1967).
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-318 (Supp. 1972). The section reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home or any
other ultimate consumer or user of the goods or person affected thereby if it is rea-
sonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section. (emphasis added).
9. Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48
VA. L. REV. 982, 985-86 (1962).
10. Id. at 985.
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The previous lack of horizontal privity is evidenced in the 1924,
pre-UCC case of State v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power
Co. I ' The court held that a deceased infant's parents could not recover
damages from a vendor of the defective gas heater that caused the
infant's death because the infant was not in privity of contract with the
vendor. Had the 1964 version of § 2-318 been available to the parents
of the child, they should have been able to recover.
A Federal District Court construed the 1964 version of § 2-318 in
Maryland in deciding Debbis v. Hertz Corp. 2 Here, Hertz leased a car
with defective brakes in Virginia that collided with decedent, a
Maryland resident, in West Virginia. His widow, as administratrix, sued
in federal court under West Virginia's Wrongful Death Act. The court
applied Maryland law' 3 and stated that the administratrix could
proceed against Hertz under the bailee-bailor principle that "[t]hird
parties injured by an automobile operated by a bailee and negligently
maintained by a bailor may prevail against the bailor."'" In finding
*§ 2-318 applicable but limited to its terms, i.e. "a buyer's family,
household and guests," the court held that "the lack of privity between
Debbis and Hertz would seem to bar plaintiff from maintaining an
action for the alleged breach by Hertz of an implied warranty of fitness.
Such actions historically have required privity, and such is rather clearly
the law of Maryland today."' ' Maryland courts, accepting the
traditional rule, had not yet followed the trend' 6 toward eliminating
the requirement of privity in warranty actions.' '
In 1971, the same court noted the current warranty rule of § 2-318
in Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc.' l In dicta the court
said Maryland no longer required privity to maintain a suit against a
manufacturer or seller for an injury sustained in the use of a chattel
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied." 9 The
holding in Uppgren did not explore the limits of Maryland's § 2-318
since the disputed accident occurred in 1967, and the amended
warranty section applied only to sales after July 1969.2 0 Nevertheless,
Uppgren indicated the federal court's willingness to expand horizontal
privity judicially.
Plaintiff in Uppgren sued two Maryland corporations and a Texas
corporation for the wrongful death of her husband, a government
11. 146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924).
12. 269 F. Supp. 671, 681 n.11 (D. Md. 1967).
13. At the time the action was brought, both Maryland and West Virginia law recognized ver-
sion "A" of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
14. 269 F. Supp. at 679.
15. Id. at 680.
16. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
17. Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671, 679 (D. Md. 1967).
18. 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971).
19. Id. at 716.
20. See generally Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969).
[Vol. 2
Privity in UCC Warranties
employee who was killed in a helicopter crash while in the course of his
employment. The helicopter was built by defendant Hughes Tool Co.,
sold by defendant Loving Chevrolet and serviced by defendant
Executive Aviation. Although plaintiff was a Minnesota resident and
the accident occurred in Minnesota, defendants in this case wanted
Maryland law applied as they felt that their liability was limited by
privity of contract. Even though Maryland was the situs of the contract
between the Department of the Interior, Loving, and Executive, the
court refused to apply Maryland law. Rather, the court creatively
reasoned that since pre-1969 warranty actions in Maryland bear such
close relationship to tort, the courts would apply lex loci delecti in this
case; accordingly, Minnesota tort law was applied. 2 The choice of law
was determined, inter alia, by noting that Professor Prosser considers
warranty as a "curious hybrid of tort and contract, unique in the
law," 2"2 and that originally the warranty action was based on tort.
Noting that "it] he Maryland Court of Appeals has quoted the views of
Prosser with approval relative to the origin of the action for breach of
implied warranty and its close kinship to tort,"2 "3 the Uppgren court
went further, stating that since Maryland did not require privity where
a dangerous instrumentality was concerned," the plaintiff would have
a good cause of action even if Maryland law was applied.
A recent state court decision, by avoiding application of the
extended warranty protection of the 1969 amendment to § 2-318,
undermined the Uppgren court's language expanding horizontal privity
in Maryland. If the decision in Bona v. Graefe2" is to be followed, a
case for further legislative expansion of warranty protection should be
made. It is significant, however, that the Bona court did not cite either
Debbis or Uppgren, nor did it mention the warranty protection of
§ 2-318. Rather, the holding rested on principles of landlord and
tenant law and on the UCC sections governing express warranties and
warranties of fitness for particular purposes.
Bona brought suit for injuries when he was thrown from a golf cart
which had gone out of control. Alleging breach of warranty and strict
21. The court said:
The fact, therefore, that Maryland has, as a general rule, required privity of
contract as a prerequisite to an action for breach of an implied or express warranty
does not necessarily mean that its courts view such an action as possessing more
of the indicia of contractual actions than of tort actions. It is believed by this court
that the highest court of Maryland, if faced with the necessity to decide the ques-
tion, would determine that an action based upon an implied warranty (arising from a
contract or sale made prior, of course, to the July 1, 1969 effective date of the
amendment to Article 95B, § 2-318, Code of Md.) bears such a close relationship
to one based upon tort that it should be subject to the rule of lex loci delicti for the
same reasons as is a tort action.
326 F. Supp. at 716.
22. Id. at 715.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 716.
25. 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
19731
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liability, Bona sued Graefe, the manager of the golf course, Royce, the
distributor of the carts, and Carrigan, the operator of the cart when
Bona was injured. In an appeal from a directed verdict for defendants
Graefe and Royce, the Court of Appeals sustained the lower court and
refused to construe § 2-31326 and § 2-3152 ' as being applicable to
bailments for hire. Stating that Bona's contention would "take us
beyond the limits of judicial restraint and into the area of judicial
legislation, a journey which we [have] refused to make,, 2 8 the court
found it anomalous that "many authors of texts and commentaries
seem to take the stance that there should be no differentiation between
sales and bailments under Article 2 of the UCC." 2 9 After giving
numerous examples of plaintiff recoveries in similar situations (where a
chattel was the subject of a lease rather than a sale),3 ° the court
contrarily concluded that "Maryland seems never to have adopted what
has been a general rule elsewhere: that the bailor of a chattel to be used
by the bailee for a particular purpose known to the bailor impliedly
warrants the reasonable suitability of the chattel for the bailee's
intended use of it."' 3 1 This finding by the court becomes relevant to
§ 2-318 when applied to the holding in Debbis v. Hertz Corp.3 2
In Bona, the court compared a bailee-bailor relationship involving a
chattel to principles of landlord and tenant cases. This analogy
bypassed the acknowledged trend toward increased protection for
bailees of chattels by either increased warranty or tort protection.
Disregarding the modern trends, the court held that because a lessor
does not impliedly warrant that real property is fit for habitation and
because the landlord is answerable at tort only when he negligently
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-313 (1964), provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention
to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a state-
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods
does not create a warranty.
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-315 (1964), states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
28. 264 Md. at 74, 285 A.2d at 610.
29. Id. at 73, 285 A.2d at 609.
30. Id. at 74-75, 285 A.2d at 610.
31. Id.
32. 269 F. Supp. 671, 681 & n.12.
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breaches a covenant to repair, the lessor of a golf cart does not extend a
warranty of fitness of purpose to the lessee.3
Although the court in Bona did not mention the warranty protection
in § 2-318, it is apparent that it could have interpreted "any other
ultimate consumer or user of the goods or person affected thereby" to
include a bailee of a golf cart. Thus, the court, using § § 2-313 and
2-315, not only limited the vertical privity of a bailee, but also closed
some advances in horizontal privity protection made by the federal
court in interpreting § 2-318 both in Uppgren and in Debbis. Although
Debbis is not cited in Bona, the bailee-bailor problem was handled
differently in the former case. The fact that the expanded § 2-318
became effective on July 1, 1969, before the leasing and accident in
Bona, is an indication that had the federal court's reasoning been
followed, Bona would have been protected.
III. § 2-318: VARIATIONS
If the current status of third party protection under § 2-318 in
Maryland is somewhat in doubt, it has thus fulfilled the prophecy of
Mr. M. King Hill, Jr., of the Virginia Bar, who wrote to the Maryland
Judiciary Committee in 1968 that the proposed change in § 2-318
would not put an end to the issue of warranty protection for third
party beneficiaries, but instead would cause further difficulty. 3 4 Hill
suggested that Maryland alternatively adopt a version of § 2-318
identical to that of Virginia.3 s Pointing out that the editorial board of
the UCC advocates local options in that section, Hill recommended the
single amendment to § 2-318 as more favorable than amending
§ § 2-314 through 2-318.
The Comment to § 2-318 in the Virginia Code states that under the
official text "[o] nly those 'natural persons' who were in the family or
household of the buyer or were guests in his home were protected."
36
However, it continues: "Recent Virginia legislation has virtually
abolished the privity defense in breach of warranty and negligence
33. 264 Md. at 76, 285 A.2d at 610.
34. Letter from M. King Hill, Jr. to Carl N. Everstine, Nov. 1, 1968, on file with the legislative
history of 1969, ch. 249, [19691 Laws of Md. 709, in the Office of Legislative Reference,
Annapolis, Md. To wit: "The proposed amendment to section 2-318 seems to me to be one
which can only lead to much litigation seeking an interpretation of the new language in-
serted."
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965), states:
When lack of privity no defense in action against manufacturer or seller of
goods.-Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for
breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did
not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the
manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be af-
fected by the goods; however, this section shall not be construed to affect any litiga-
tion pending on June twenty-nine, nineteen hundred sixty two.
36. Id.
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suits." 3 Virginia's § 2-318 has been characterized as a codification of
the doctrine of strict liability for products.' 8 Perhaps it would have
aided Maryland to adopt the Virginia version of this section, but
Maryland courts had not "virtually abolished" the privity defense in
1969. In light of Bona, it is not certain that the privity requirement for
third parties is abolished yet. If Maryland had copied Virginia's
§ 2-318, it would have been a case of legislative preemption, forcing
the court to change privity-defense concepts. 3 9
Comment 3 of the UCC Official Comments to § 2-318 points out
that variation "A" is only applicable to the named persons and
"[b] eyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain."4  Section 2-318 was criticized in California as "a step
backward," and was omitted from the Code in that state.4
Alternative "B" is essentially the same as the version of § 2-318"2
adopted in the 1950 Proposed Final Draft of the Code.4 "C" is
"drawn to reflect the trend of more recent decisions as indicated by the
Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A4 4 . . . extending the rule beyond
personal injuries."4 It was mentioned in Bona that Maryland has twice
rejected the doctrine in § 402A but that "the principle enunciated...
[therein ] is gaining acceptance." 4 6
37. Id.
38. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 816 (1965).
39. For an analysis of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965), see generally 51 VA. L. REV. 804 (1965).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3 (1962 version).
41. 6 UCC REP.-DIG. § 2-318, at 1-100.1.
42. A warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of the buyer or who is his guest or one whose relationship to
him is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Id.
43. Id.
44. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
45. 6 UCC REP.-DIG. § 2-318, at 1-100.2.
46. 264 Md. at 77, 285 A.2d at 611. The Restatement position was rejected in Myers v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); and Telak v. Maszczenski, 248
Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
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A comparison of the variations "B"and "C" shows that "B" retains
the phrase "natural person" in the first sentence whereas "C" does not.
Alternative "B" notes that the warranty extends to one "who is injured
in person" but "C" omits the "in person" requirement. While all three
official versions state that "[a] seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section," variation "C" 's addition of "with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends" is
most significant. This additional phrase grafts the spirit of § 402A
indelibly into variation "C". Disclaimers under "C" would not be valid,
as opposed to Virginia's version of § 2-318 which allows a valid
disclaimer under § 2-316(2) if not unconscionable." Of the three
official versions of § 2-318, the most popular is alternative "A"4" as
adopted by Maryland in 1964.
The official UCC comment states that the sentence "[a] seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section," in version "A," can
be excluded or modified by a disclaimer under § 2-316. Thus, an
innocent third party has no greater rights than a purchaser (or
sub-purchaser), or in other words, both share the same vertical privity.
The extent of this vertical privity will be determined when the Court of
Appeals has the opportunity to construe Maryland's unique § 2-
316A4 in conjunction with Art. 95B, § § 2-314'0 and 2-715(2).'
47. Speidel, supra note 38, at 837.
48. 6 UCC RFP.-DIG. § 2-318, at 1-100.2.:
State Variations
Alternative B has been adopted in: Delaware (with variation), Kansas, Rhode Island
(with variation), South Carolina (with variation), Vermont.
Alternative C has been adopted in: Colorado (with variation), Hawaii, Minnesota
(with variation), North Dakota, South Dakota (with variation), Wyoming (with
variation).
All other states, except Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia, have adopted Alternative A.
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-316A (Supp. 1972), provides:
The provisions of § 2-316 shall not apply to sales of consumer goods, as defined
by § 9-109, services or both. Any language, oral or written, used by a seller of con-
sumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify any implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or mod-
ify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable,
provided however, that the seller may recover from the manufacturer any damages
resulting from breach of the above-described warranty.
Any language, oral or written, used by a manufacturer of consumer goods, which
attempts to limit or modify a consumer's remedies for breach of the manufacturer's
express warranties, shall be unenforceable, unless the manufacturer provides rea-
sonable and expeditious means of performing the warranty obligations.
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-314 (Supp. 1972), provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subtitle,
in §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this subtitle, "seller" shall include the manufacturer,
distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman, and/or the retailer; and any
previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer and any of the
aforementioned parties in any action brought by the buyer. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale.
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There is a strong indication that the ultimate consumer, not just the
retailer, will be protected by the additions to § 2-314.1 2
IV. APPLICATION OF PIERCEFIELD
At this point, it is interesting to speculate on the scope of § 2-318
had the famous case of Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.' s occurred
in Maryland today. That case involved a shooting accident in Michigan
in 1957 (the UCC was adopted in that state effective as of 1964) when
the plaintiff, standing beside his brother, was injured by a defective
shell in the shotgun his brother was using. The defective shell caused
the shotgun to explode, and Piercefield was injured by the shrapnel. No
special weight was attached to the fact that plaintiff's brother,
purchaser of the shell, was involved. The case therefore presented the
issue of an injured innocent bystander not in privity with the retailer,
wholesaler, or manufacturer.
The Michigan Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed against
the manufacturer on the theory of breach of implied warranty as well
as the theory of negligence of the manufacturer. It was specifically
noted that the warranties involved here went beyond the contract of
sale and were not imposed by force of the Uniform Sales Act, but
evolved from common law decisions in similar situations.
Despite the dicta in Uppgren that Maryland no longer requires privity
in cases involving a dangerous instrumentality, at common law the
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
quire; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-715 (1964), provides:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody
of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty.
52. See Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & TV Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970); notes
54-57, 62, 64 infra and accompanying text.
53. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
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plaintiff in Piercefield would have had uncertain success in Maryland
against a remote manufacturer, and would be fortunate indeed to
recover against the retailer. Under version "A" of § 2-318, Piercefield
would no longer be an innocent bystander, but would be a member of
his brother's family and therefore entitled to warranty protection. Of
course, if Piercefield had been a hunter in the field standing beside a
stranger with a defective shell, a resultant explosion spraying shrapnel
might not have been covered before 1969 in Maryland if the reasoning
in Debbis v. Hertz Corp. were applied. At this point, vertical privity
becomes important: Would Piercefield, if covered by § 2-318 before
1969, have been able to reach Remington? Would he be able to reach
Remington now?
In Erdman v. Johnson Brothers Radio & Television Co., 5 4 the court
said that prior to the UCC there had been cases in which the "action
was based on implied warranty of the fitness of a product as limited by
the common law and the Uniform Sales Act."" s Noting that there have
been cases "involving manufacturers' products liability bottomed on
tort,"' 6 the court also stated that subsequent to the adoption of the
UCC in Maryland "[t] here have been cases based on the breach of the
manufacturer's or seller's warranty as to the fitness of a chattel for its
intended use." ' ' Based on this, if a purchaser has vertical privity, the
advent of Maryland's § 2-318 assures the same protection to those
covered before 1969 and "to any ultimate consumer" now. "Any
ultimate consumer" can be limited if a court too narrowly construes
the phrase "reasonable to expect such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods," but this would be antagonistic to the legislative
purpose of expanding consumer protection. It is reasonable to assume
that Piercefield could recover from Remington in Maryland today using
§ 2-318. If Piercefield was standing beside a stranger in a pre-1969
hunting incident, his best chance for success would be if his suit were
based on the manufacturer's liability in tort.
V. LATENT-PATENT DEFECT TEST
APPLIED TO WARRANTIES
Aside from the "reasonable to expect" limitation above, the
latent-patent defect aspect also limits warranty-based recovery actions.
The latent-patent defect criterio- was well set out in Blankenship v.
54. 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
55. Id. at 201, 271 A.2d at 749-50.
56. Id. at 201, 271 A.2d at 750. The court cited: "Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 209, 303, 138
A.2d 375 (1958); Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 420, 84 A.2d 81 (1951), citing Milestone
System v. Gasior, 160 Md. 121, 152 . 810 (1931). Cf. also Woollay v. Uebelhor, 239 Md.
318, 211 A.2d 302 (1965)."
57. 260 Md. at 201, 271 A.2d at 750. Cases cited for fitness for intended use were Myers v.
Montgomery Ward, 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969), see note 46 supra, and Levin v.
Walter Kidde & Co.. 251 Md. 560. 248 A.2d 151 (1968).
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Morrison Machine Co." 8 There, it was determined that neither the
designer nor the vendor of a cloth sanforizing machine was liable to an
employee of the purchaser who had sustained injury when his hand and
arm were caught by the machine. The court held that the lack of
protective guards was obvious and thus a "patent," rather than a
"latent" (or concealed) defect. The court came to a reasonable
conclusion: where the buyer or user of an object is aware of the danger
in using the object, he cannot recover if he is accidentally injured in the
anticipated manner. Examples would be cutting oneself with a knife,
ax, or saw, or being burned by a match. It is only when a hidden (or
latent) defect is present that the victim of an accident has grounds for
recovery.' 
The court rejected the argument that this case involved recovery
based on breach of warranty, and again affirmed that "It] he case law
of Maryland is that there must be privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant to enable the plaintiff to recover on a warranty." 6 This
tempers Uppgren's appraisal of common law warranty rights in
Maryland and indicates that a pre-UCC Piercefield would take his
chances against Remington only based on tort liability. However, the
court specifically noted that Blankenship was not decided under the
1969 addition to Art. 95B, § 2-318, since the incident occurred in
1968 and the machine was purchased in 1954. Further, the pre-1969
§ 2-318 in Maryland was not applicable as the court found the
determinative date to be the sale of the machine.
Patten v. Logeman Brothers Co.,6' a 1971 case that closely
resembles Blankenship (in Patten a paper-bailing machine was involved),
was decided for the defendant-manufacturer on the latent-patent
criteria used in Blankenship. No mention was made in Patten of either
privity or warranty protection.
Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co.6 2 applied the
latent-patent test in a situation that the court found would otherwise
be covered by the UCC. Erdman did not involve horizontal privity, but
it was rather an illustration of a limitation on warranties when the
latent-patent test is involved. Erdman purchased a television from
Johnson which within a few months began to give off sparks and
smoke. A repairman for Johnson fixed it temporarily, but a few months
later the problem recurred. Johnson assured Erdman that a repairman
58. 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969).
59. Id. at 244, 257 A.2d at 432. The court said:
The manufacturer of a mower is not an insurer, and is under no duty to make
an accident proof product* * *. No cause of action is made out in the absence of an
allegation that the injury was caused by a latent defect not known to the plaintiff or
a danger not obvious to him, which was attendant on proper use! * * 'There is cer-
tainly no usual duty to warn the buyer that a knife or axe will cut, a match will take
fire, dynamite will explode or a hammer will mash a finger***
60. Id. at 246, 257 A.2d at 433.
61. 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971).
62. 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
[Vol. 2
Privity in UCC Warranties
would come to the house in three days. During the interim, Erdman
tried the television and again observed sparks and smoke. That night the
defective television caused a fire which destroyed Erdman's house, a
loss of almost $68,000.
The Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the television did
not conform to the standard of merchantability required by
§ 2-314(2)(c), and also that Erdman, although an ultimate consumer,
was protected by the UCC. However, the court held that using the
television in these circumstances amounted to using an instrumentality
with a patent defect, and therefore defeated Erdman's recovery. In
support of its application of the latent-patent criteria to Erdman, the
court quoted Prosser,6 3  whose contention it is that the word
"warranty" camouflages the real question in cases where a person is
accidentally injured by an object with a patent defect. Although the
contention receives support by the unsettled nature of the case law on
the issue of whether negligence can be imputed to the one injured by a
breach of warranty, it is really, however, a matter of semantics.
"Negligence," where a user has merely failed to discover a "latent"
defect, is not a bar to action against a manufacturer for breach of
warranty. This is not the situation where one who is aware that a course
of conduct may lead to injury (with an object that has a "patent"
defect) proceeds in that conduct in spite of the potential injury, and is
subsequently injured. Here the user is guilty of either contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk, or both, and thus does not have
recourse against a manufacturer.
6 4
As Emroch points out, "The emphasis will now shift from privity, or
lack of it, to proximate cause and foreseeability. The abrogation of
privity, however, does rot mean that the manufacturer and seller
become insurers."'6 s Although this was written in regard to the Virginia
version of § 2-318,6 6 it is also fair commentary on the Maryland
63. Superficially the warranty cases, whether on direct sale to the user or without
privity, are in a state of complete contradiction and confusion as to the defense of
contributory negligence. It has been said in a good many of them that such negli-
gence is always a defense to an action for breach of warranty. It has been said in
almost as many that it is never a defense. This is no more than a part of the general
murk that has surrounded warranty," and is one more indication that this unfelici-
tous word is a source of trouble in the field. Actually, however, the disagreement is
solely a matter of language; and if the cases are examined as to their substance,
they fall into a very consistent pattern.
Where the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure to discover the
danger in the product, or to take precautions against its possible existence, it has
uniformly been held that it is not a bar to an action for breach of warranty.... But
if he discovers the defect, or knows the danger arising from it, and proceeds never-
theless deliberately to encounter it bv making use of the product, his conduct is the
kind of contributory negligence which overlaps assumntion of risk; and on either
theory his recovery is barred ....
Id. at 198, 271 A.2d at 749, citing Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 32 AM. TR. LAW. ASS'N.
J. 1, 21 (1968).
64. 260 Md. at 198, 271 A.2d at 749.
65. Emroch, supra note 9, at 991.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
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situation. Taken in this light, the latent-patent test is understandable
and not without justification. However, if Maryland is to expand
consumer protection, the latent-patent test in close cases should be
resolved in favor of the consumer.
VI. CONCLUSION
When warranties to third parties are involved, Maryland courts have
stressed that change must come from the legislature. The legislature saw
the need for change in 1969 and amended Art. 95B, § 2-318
accordingly. It remains to be seen whether the Maryland courts can
now apply this law so as to protect third party beneficiaries adequately.
If the extent of the court's range when establishing manufacturers'
and sellers' negligence and warranty liability should be "squared with
the imagination and ingenuity of the manufacturer and seller, and their
expert advertising agencies in trying to reach the largest possible market
for their goods, then the protection under the statute should be
extended to the entire public." 6" Certainly, this is a logical and fair
appraisal of realistic consumer protection. In view of this, consumers in
Maryland are unjustly injured when Bona-type decisions are handed
down.
The changes made by the Maryland legislature in 1969 in § § 2-314
through 2-318 are sufficient to expand the protection of third party
beneficiaries of warranties in Maryland. Since the legislature has
provided the tools, the courts should use them with proper liberality. Tf
it happens that the legislature must take the lead again, either the
§ 2-318 adopted by Virginia or alternative "C" (the UCC codification
of the Restatement of Torts' position) would present an unequivocal
statement of legislative intent that would be particularly hard to ignore.
Allen J. Katz
67. Emroch, supra note 9, at 991.
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